| Agent Identity & Authorisation | Each agent must have its own identity, which no human user and no other agent holds. | Actions cannot be attributed to a single agent because identities are shared. | |
| Agent Identity & Authorisation | Credentials issued to an agent identity must be bound to that identity and must be rejected when presented by any other principal. | A compromised secret gives access to several agents or users. | |
| Agent Identity & Authorisation | The platform must issue agent credentials at task start, and the credentials must expire no later than the end of the task. | Static credentials remain valid after compromise and after the task has ended. | |
| Agent Identity & Authorisation | Each agent must hold no standing permissions beyond those required by its declared task. | Agents hold broad permissions because precise scoping was harder than granting them. | |
| Agent Identity & Authorisation | Where an agent's credentials cannot be issued at runtime, they must be rotated on a defined cycle and immediately on change of agent owner, decommissioning or suspected compromise. | Long-lived static keys outlive the agent, its owner and the reason it existed. | |
| Agent Identity & Authorisation | Agents must not use human-facing authentication artefacts (session cookies, personal API keys, MFA-backed tokens). | An agent inherits the full privileges of a human account. | |
| Agent Identity & Authorisation | Authorisation must be enforced at the point of tool invocation, not only at the network perimeter. | Perimeter controls do not see what an agent does once inside. | |
| Agent Identity & Authorisation | Elevated privileges granted to an agent must be time-bound and must downgrade automatically. | Elevation granted for a one-off need becomes standing access. | |
| Agent Identity & Authorisation | When the agent acts on behalf of a person, its data access must be limited to data that person is authorised to access. | The agent retrieves or changes data the requesting person could not reach directly (confused deputy). | |
| Agent Identity & Authorisation | Elevation of the agent's privileges must be approved by a named human or another agent through the approval path defined for the agent. | An agent escalates its own privileges, or one agent elevates another's, without control. | |
| Agent Identity & Authorisation | An alert must be raised when the agent acquires a new permission, directly or through delegation, outside an approved change. | Privileges accumulate unnoticed through delegation chains and shared tools. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | Each agent must have a documented action-space stating permitted and prohibited actions. | Nobody can say what the agent is allowed to do, and its scope grows unchecked. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | Each agent must be restricted to the tools on its allowlist; all other tools must be denied by default. | New tools expand the agent's blast radius without review. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | Irreversible actions on the high-risk operation list must be blocked or require explicit human confirmation before execution. | An unrecoverable error is executed at machine speed. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | Quantitative limits on the scope of work must be enforced for the agent: records touched, message volume, external calls and concurrency. | The agent runs far beyond the scale it was designed for. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | The agent must operate in an environment isolated from production data and systems that its task does not require. | A compromised agent moves laterally into systems its task never needed. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | Agents must not execute self-generated or externally supplied code outside a sandbox. | Hidden instructions or generated code achieve remote code execution on the host. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | Financial and legally binding actions may be executed autonomously only when listed in the agent's action-space and below a defined limit; all others must be approved by a named human. | The organisation incurs financial or contractual exposure without a human decision. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | Rate limiting and circuit breakers must separate the planning layer from the execution layer. | A flawed plan executes to completion before anyone notices. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | Tool access must be granted just in time for the task and revoked on completion. | Tool access persists between tasks and widens the blast radius. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | The execution sandbox must be reset or destroyed after each tool execution. | Malicious code persists in the sandbox and carries over between executions. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | Agent processes must be suspended automatically when the agent's consumption of compute, tokens, tool calls or spend exceeds the thresholds defined for it. | Runaway consumption exhausts budgets and denies service to other users. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | Outbound data transfer from the agent must be limited by volume and rate, and transfers above the limit must be blocked. | The agent exfiltrates data at a volume nobody set a limit on. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | The agent must send data only to destinations on its allowlist, and each allowlisted destination must be linked to the agent's declared purpose. | Data is exfiltrated through a permitted tool to a destination unrelated to the agent's purpose. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | The agent identity must have no permission to write to protected branches. | Agent-generated code reaches protected branches without passing review. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | A pull request authored by an agent must not be merged until static analysis, secret scanning and dependency checks pass. | Vulnerabilities, secrets and unsafe dependencies enter the codebase at machine speed and volume. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | A pull request authored by an agent that changes code on the privileged-operations list must not be merged until a named human has reviewed it. | Backdoors or unsafe changes to privileged code are merged without human scrutiny. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | Tool calls must resolve to fully qualified tool identities, and tools with duplicate or look-alike names must be rejected at registration. | A malicious tool shadows a legitimate one through a duplicate or look-alike name. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | Code execution sandboxes must have no network egress except to destinations on the sandbox allowlist. | Generated or injected code exfiltrates data or downloads payloads from inside the sandbox. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | Identifiers, amounts and recipients in the parameters of the agent's write actions must be checked against the authoritative business system that holds that data (for example the CRM, ERP or payment master data) before execution. | A hallucinated account, amount or recipient becomes a real transaction. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | Scanning, exploitation and credential-harvesting actions against systems outside the agent's authorised scope must be blocked and logged. | An agent with network, code or browser tools is used, or manipulated, to attack third parties. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | While presenting a preview or draft to a person, the agent must not execute any state-changing call until the person confirms. | Rendering or previewing content triggers side effects the person has not approved. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | Physical actions commanded by the agent must be bounded by a safety system independent of the agent - interlocks, safety PLC or hard limits - that the agent cannot modify or override. | An agent error or compromise drives equipment beyond safe limits because the only safeguard is the agent itself. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | The agent must reach operational-technology systems only through defined zones and conduits, with no direct path from enterprise or internet networks. | A compromised enterprise or cloud-connected agent becomes a path into the control network. | |
| Action Bounding & Blast Radius | An agent operating a user interface must run in an isolated browser or desktop session holding only the accounts its task requires. | A computer-use agent reaches everything the logged-in user can, through screens no API policy sees. | |
| Instruction, Data & Goal Integrity | System instructions must be structurally separated from all externally sourced content. | The model treats externally sourced data as instructions. | |
| Instruction, Data & Goal Integrity | Content from tool output, retrieved documents and inter-agent messages must be passed to the model marked as untrusted. | Instructions hidden in tool output, documents or messages hijack the agent (indirect prompt injection). | |
| Instruction, Data & Goal Integrity | Content from sources not explicitly designated as trusted must be converted to plain text, with hidden text, active content and metadata removed, before it enters the context window. | Hidden payloads in documents, web pages and email reach the model. | |
| Instruction, Data & Goal Integrity | The origin of every retrieved item placed in context must be logged. | Nobody can determine after the fact what influenced a decision. | |
| Instruction, Data & Goal Integrity | Agent inputs must pass through a content filter before they reach the model. | Prohibited or out-of-scope content enters the model's context. | |
| Instruction, Data & Goal Integrity | Agent outputs must pass through a content filter before they reach a person or a downstream system. | Harmful, non-compliant or out-of-scope output, including personal data, secrets, system instructions or internal identifiers, reaches a person or system. | |
| Instruction, Data & Goal Integrity | Changes to the agent's prompts, system instructions, tools, permissions and configuration must be version-controlled and reviewed before release. | Agent behaviour changes without review or a way to roll back. | |
| Instruction, Data & Goal Integrity | The agent's active goals must be compared with its defined objective set before each plan step, and a goal outside the set must be blocked and logged. | Injected sub-goals gradually move the agent away from its objective. | |
| Instruction, Data & Goal Integrity | Goal-modification attempts by the agent must be counted, and an alert must be raised when the count within a task exceeds the threshold defined for the agent. | Repeated injection attempts against one agent go unnoticed. | |
| Instruction, Data & Goal Integrity | The agent's objective and operational parameters must be stored outside its write scope and changed only through its owner's change process. | The agent rewrites its own objective, producing self-reinforcing loops or misaligned goals. | |
| Instruction, Data & Goal Integrity | The agent must have documented counter-objectives alongside its primary objective, each with a named metric. | The agent achieves exactly what it was asked at the expense of an outcome nobody thought to protect. | |
| Instruction, Data & Goal Integrity | Counter-objective metrics must be monitored, and an alert must be raised when one degrades beyond its defined threshold. | A protected outcome degrades unnoticed while the agent pursues its goal. | |
| Instruction, Data & Goal Integrity | The agent must have a defined list of prohibited outputs for its use case, and outputs must be checked against the list before release. | An agent built for one purpose issues out-of-scope advice or statements (e.g. financial, medical, legal). | |
| Instruction, Data & Goal Integrity | Each agent's prompts, system instructions, tools, permissions and configuration must be modifiable only by roles authorised for that agent. | Someone without authority reconfigures the agent and changes its behaviour. | |
| Memory & Context Integrity | Long-term memory must have a defined retention period and must be purged on schedule. | Personal and internal data accumulate in memory indefinitely. | |
| Memory & Context Integrity | Long-term memory contents must be reviewed periodically for information that must not be retained. | Personal data and internal information accumulate in memory unnoticed. | |
| Memory & Context Integrity | Every memory read by the agent must be logged with the agent identity, the task and the entries read. | Nobody can tell which memory entries influenced a decision. | |
| Memory & Context Integrity | Memory writes must be checked against memory anomaly rules (instruction-like text, new external URLs, write-volume spikes), and a match must raise an alert. | A poisoned memory entry is reused in later sessions without anyone being alerted. | |
| Memory & Context Integrity | Changes to persistent memory must be validated before commit against a trusted source, an independent check, or both. | Unverified or fabricated knowledge persists across sessions. | |
| Memory & Context Integrity | Memory retrieval must be filtered by scope tags, so that an agent reads only entries tagged for the current task or principal. | Data from one principal surfaces to another, or one task's content contaminates another. | |
| Memory & Context Integrity | Memory and knowledge updates must be versioned with their source and lineage logged, and memory must be restorable to a previous version without rebuilding the agent. | Nobody can trace how a belief entered the agent, and it cannot be undone. | |
| Memory & Context Integrity | Memory entries that have not been validated must expire after a period defined for the agent. | Poisoned entries persist long enough to be reused across many sessions. | |
| Memory & Context Integrity | The agent's working context, temporary files and tool sessions must be isolated per principal and cleared when the session ends. | One customer's data is exposed to another through shared runtime state. | |
| Tool, Connector & Supply Chain | Tools, connectors and MCP servers must be obtained only from sources with an identified responsible party and a published release mechanism. | Components of unknown provenance run inside the agent. | |
| Tool, Connector & Supply Chain | Tool and skill descriptions must be monitored for change, and any change must be re-reviewed before continued use. | A tool description is poisoned after its initial approval and the change goes unnoticed. | |
| Tool, Connector & Supply Chain | Every tool an agent can call must pass a documented interface review covering authentication, input validation, rate limits and error handling before it is added to the allowlist. | Tools are connected as configuration, without review as attack surface. | |
| Tool, Connector & Supply Chain | An externally sourced agent or agent component must pass intake assessment before connection to internal systems or data. | Vendor agents gain internal access without scrutiny. | |
| Tool, Connector & Supply Chain | Secrets must not be available to the agent's tool layer in plaintext. | Credentials are exposed through tool output or logs. | |
| Tool, Connector & Supply Chain | Agent cards, prompt templates and model and tool definitions must be digitally signed, and the signature must be verified at load. | Tampered agent logic is loaded and executed. | |
| Tool, Connector & Supply Chain | A bill of materials listing the agent's model, prompts, tools and runtime components must be maintained and versioned with each release. | Runtime components are undocumented, so exposure to a compromised component cannot be determined. | |
| Tool, Connector & Supply Chain | The agent must use only models on the approved model list, which documents each provider's data retention, use of inputs and outputs for training, and processing location. | Customer or regulated data is sent to a provider that retains it, trains on it or processes it in an unapproved jurisdiction. | |
| Tool, Connector & Supply Chain | It must be possible to disable a tool, MCP server or model version for all agents that use it from a single control point. | A poisoned dependency stays active in some agents while others are cleaned up. | |
| Tool, Connector & Supply Chain | Changes to the agent's prompts, tools or model must be rolled out in stages and rolled back if evaluation results fall below the agent's baseline. | A defective or poisoned change reaches every user at once. | |
| Tool, Connector & Supply Chain | Self-hosted model weights must be obtained from a verified source, and their hash must be verified before every load. | Backdoored or tampered weights are loaded into a model that runs with no provider in the loop. | |
| Tool, Connector & Supply Chain | Model and software updates to self-hosted or edge deployments must be transferred through a controlled channel and integrity-verified before installation. | Updates to air-gapped or field systems arrive on unverified media or channels. | |
| Tool, Connector & Supply Chain | Devices running the agent at the edge must protect the model and credentials at rest and detect physical tampering. | A stolen or opened device yields the model, its credentials and a path into central systems. | |
| Multi-Agent Delegation & Communication | Inter-agent messages must be authenticated and integrity-protected. | Forged agent identities inject instructions between agents. | |
| Multi-Agent Delegation & Communication | Delegation depth must be limited by configuration. | Chains of agents invoking agents grow without bound. | |
| Multi-Agent Delegation & Communication | An agent must not be able to grant another agent authority it does not itself hold. | Privileges escalate through delegation. | |
| Multi-Agent Delegation & Communication | Multi-agent topology must be documented: pattern, participants and authority flow. | Nobody can describe how the multi-agent system behaves or where authority flows. | |
| Multi-Agent Delegation & Communication | Loop and cost circuit breakers must operate across the agent group, not only per agent. | A group-level runaway continues because only per-agent limits apply. | |
| Multi-Agent Delegation & Communication | Inter-agent messages must carry a status (success, error, partial) and pass schema validation, and a receiving agent must reject input whose status is not success or which fails validation. | Errors and hallucinations spread across cooperating agents as valid input. | |
| Multi-Agent Delegation & Communication | The agent must send messages only to the agents listed for it in the documented multi-agent topology; all other agent-to-agent routes must be blocked. | One compromised agent can reach every other agent. | |
| Multi-Agent Delegation & Communication | High-risk operations in a multi-agent system must be verified by an independent agent or a human before execution. | A single compromised agent authorises a critical action unchallenged. | |
| Multi-Agent Delegation & Communication | The agent must be assigned a trust zone, for example: internal managed, third-party under contract, or public or unknown. | Agents with different owners, controls and accountability trust each other implicitly. | |
| Multi-Agent Delegation & Communication | Authority must not flow from a lower trust zone to a higher one. | An agent in a less trusted zone directs actions in a more trusted one. | |
| Multi-Agent Delegation & Communication | Messages crossing a trust-zone boundary must be validated at the boundary. | Unvalidated content from a less trusted zone enters a more trusted one. | |
| Multi-Agent Delegation & Communication | Inter-agent messages must carry a nonce or timestamp, and replayed or expired messages must be rejected. | A valid, signed instruction is replayed to repeat an action. | |
| Multi-Agent Delegation & Communication | Inter-agent and tool protocols must be limited to allowed versions, and downgrade attempts must be rejected. | A connection is downgraded to a weaker protocol mode that skips authentication or validation. | |
| Multi-Agent Delegation & Communication | An agent must join a multi-agent system only through authenticated registration; open registration must be disabled. | Rogue or impersonating agents enter the system through discovery. | |
| Human Oversight & Disclosure | The level of human involvement must be defined for each agent. | Oversight is either absent or applied uniformly regardless of consequence. | |
| Human Oversight & Disclosure | The agent must have a defined escalation trigger list; every trigger must state its condition, threshold and the receiving human role. | Oversight is undefined and in practice defaults to none. | |
| Human Oversight & Disclosure | Reviewers must be able to see enough of the agent's reasoning and action history to make a substantive decision. | Reviewers approve without the information to judge, and approval becomes rubber-stamping. | |
| Human Oversight & Disclosure | People interacting with an agent must be told they are interacting with an AI system at first contact, and the interface must show this persistently. | People do not know they are dealing with an AI system, and disclosure obligations under the EU AI Act and comparable rules are breached. | |
| Human Oversight & Disclosure | When a person asks whether they are interacting with an AI system, the agent must confirm that it is. | A person who asks is misled about talking to a machine. | |
| Human Oversight & Disclosure | Reviewer workload and approval rates must be monitored, and approval rates approaching 100 per cent must be investigated. | Automation bias hollows out human review. | |
| Human Oversight & Disclosure | Agent outputs presented to people must carry uncertainty or confidence signalling. | People over-trust confidently stated but unverified output. | |
| Human Oversight & Disclosure | Approval requests to human reviewers must be rate-limited per reviewer and distributed across the reviewer pool. | Reviewers flooded with requests, deliberately or accidentally, rubber-stamp approvals. | |
| Human Oversight & Disclosure | The agent must render links and attachments to a person only when the person requested them. | The agent becomes a delivery mechanism for phishing links or malicious files. | |
| Human Oversight & Disclosure | The agent must not make commitments to a person outside its declared action-space. | The agent makes binding commitments on the organisation's behalf without authority. | |
| Human Oversight & Disclosure | People interacting with the agent must be able to report a problem or stop the interaction, and each report must be logged and reviewed. | Harm noticed by the affected person never reaches anyone who can act. | |
| Human Oversight & Disclosure | Messages the agent sends to external parties must identify the sending organisation and state that they were generated by an AI system. | Recipients of agent-sent emails or messages are misled about the sender. | |
| Human Oversight & Disclosure | An adverse action about an identified person derived from the agent's monitoring output must be confirmed by a human before it takes effect. | A person is stopped, disciplined or reported because of a misidentification nobody checked. | |
| Human Oversight & Disclosure | Where per-action human confirmation is not feasible within the control loop, the agent's operating envelope must be defined and enforced, and every excursion must alert an operator. | Human oversight is assumed in a loop too fast for any person, so nothing bounds the agent in practice. | |
| | Agent logs must capture tool calls, data accessed, external transmissions, permission changes and errors. | Logs omit the fields an investigation needs. | |
| | Agent logs must be written to append-only storage and cryptographically signed. | A compromised agent or insider tampers with the logs. | |
| | Agent logs must be retained for the retention period defined for the agent. | Evidence expires before it is needed. | |
| | Every agent action must be traceable to both the agent identity and the principal on whose behalf it acted. | An action logged under the agent identity alone cannot be traced to the person who authorised it (confused deputy). | |
| | Behavioural baselines must be established for the agent, and deviation alerts must be configured. | Goal drift and rogue behaviour go unnoticed. | |
| | The platform must compare the Agent Registry with agents observed in identity, gateway, network, endpoint, model-API and credential telemetry, and must log each unregistered or inactive agent. | Shadow agents operate with real permissions and no owner or controls; retired agents keep live credentials. | |
| | An independent model must audit agent behaviour for goal deviation, deceptive output and identity anomalies. | Misalignment and deception go undetected because they do not appear in conventional logs. | |
| | Tool-call sequences must be matched against the defined list of prohibited sequences, and a match must be blocked and raise an alert. | Individually permitted tool calls combine into a prohibited outcome. | |
| | Human overrides of agent decisions must be logged, and actions denied then subsequently approved must be flagged. | Requesters shop for approval across reviewers or agents, and refusals are quietly overturned. | |
| | Each agent's consumption of compute, tokens, tool calls and spend must be monitored, and a notification must be issued when consumption exceeds the alert thresholds defined for the agent. | Abnormal consumption, often the earliest sign that an agent is misbehaving, goes unnoticed until a hard limit is reached or the bill arrives. | |
| | Prompt-injection attempts detected in the agent's inputs must be logged and must raise an alert. | Targeted injection campaigns go unnoticed while individual attempts are blocked. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | Every agent must be registered in the Agent Registry, with all fields in the Agent Registry Schema completed and kept current. | Unregistered agents operate without assigned ownership, permissions or required controls. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | Each agent must be re-reviewed on model change, tool addition, action-space expansion, new delegation, an incident or a new counterparty. | Controls remain sized for an agent that no longer exists. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | Each agent must be reviewed at the interval defined for it, covering its permissions, action-space and control status, and the review must be documented. | Permissions accumulate and controls drift over the agent's life when no change event triggers a review. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | Before deployment, each agent must pass its defined pre-deployment test cases, and the results must be documented. | Injection, tool-misuse and permission defects are found in production instead of before release. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | Decommissioning must remove credentials, authorisations, memory and third-party grants, and close external access points. | A retired agent leaves residual access and orphaned credentials behind. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | Subscriptions and metered services associated with a decommissioned agent must be cancelled at decommissioning. | Third-party services keep access after the agent is shut down. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | Billing for a decommissioned agent must be checked for continuing charges for at least one billing cycle after decommissioning. | Costs continue after the agent is shut down. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | Agents with no logged activity for a defined period must be reviewed for decommissioning. | Dormant agents retain live permissions. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | Before deployment, the agent must be tested with a poisoned tool description, a tampered MCP server and a poisoned retrieval source, and must execute none of the injected actions. | Supply-chain defences remain untested until a real compromise. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | Model versions and configuration must be pinned per agent. | A provider-side model update silently changes agent behaviour. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | A new model version must not be adopted until it passes the agent's test protocol. | An untested model version goes into production. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | It must be possible to return an agent to its previous model version and configuration. | A faulty model update cannot be rolled back. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | An internally built agent must not be connected to internal systems or data until its deployment approval is documented. | Internally built agents go straight to production without governance. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | Each agent must be adversarially tested after deployment by testers independent of its builders, at the interval defined for it, covering injection, tool misuse, and harmful and out-of-scope output. | Defences degrade after release as models, tools and attack techniques change. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | An agent acceptable-use policy must state who may build, deploy and connect agents and which uses are prohibited. | Staff build and connect agents with no rules to follow or breach. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | Legal and regulatory obligations applicable to the agent's use case must be documented in the Agent Registry. | Controls are sized without regard to sector rules, privacy law or AI-specific regulation. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | Before deployment, the agent must be tested against adversarial and degraded sensor inputs defined for its environment - occlusion, adversarial patches, spoofed signals, low light, noise - and must meet defined detection and false-action limits. | A printed patch, glare or a spoofed signal makes the agent miss a person or act on something that is not there. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | Changes to the model or logic of an agent that acts on physical equipment must be validated in simulation or a digital twin before release to live equipment. | A model update is first exercised on live equipment and people. | |
| Lifecycle & Change Management | Where the agent monitors people, its purpose, observation categories and retention must be documented in a privacy impact assessment approved before deployment. | Surveillance capability is deployed and repurposed without a lawful, proportionate basis. | |
| Incident Response & Resilience | Every agent must have an emergency stop that halts execution mid-task. | An agent cannot be interrupted once it has begun acting. | |
| Incident Response & Resilience | The emergency stop must be tested at a defined interval and after any material change. | The emergency stop fails when needed because it has never been exercised. | |
| Incident Response & Resilience | The agent must have a named owner and deputy, documented in the Agent Registry. | Nobody responds when the agent misbehaves outside business hours. | |
| Incident Response & Resilience | Agent incidents must be classified under the catalogue's agent incident taxonomy, which covers safety and security failure modes. | Incidents that are neither a breach nor an outage fall between processes. | |
| Incident Response & Resilience | The incident response procedure must include agent-specific steps: credential revocation, memory quarantine and tool disconnection. | Standard incident response leaves the agent's credentials, memory and tool access in place. | |
| Incident Response & Resilience | Blocked high-risk actions, denied approvals and tripped circuit breakers must be logged as near misses and reviewed alongside incidents. | Control weaknesses shown by blocked or denied actions go unnoticed until an incident. | |
| Incident Response & Resilience | A suspected rogue agent must be isolated together with its memory and communication history, and its privileges must be revoked. | Containment leaves memory and credentials intact, so the compromise survives. | |
| Incident Response & Resilience | Attempts by an isolated agent to rejoin under a new identity must be detected by matching its code, configuration or credentials. | An isolated agent re-registers under a new identity and resumes. | |
| Incident Response & Resilience | For the model and provider documented in the Agent Registry, a documented and owned response must exist for loss of that dependency: provider outage, model deprecation or withdrawal, or a change of commercial or licensing terms. | A business process stops or degrades when a provider withdraws, degrades or reprices a model on its own timetable. | |
| Incident Response & Resilience | Agent output quality must be monitored against a baseline, with alerting on degradation. | Output quality declines silently after a model, prompt or data change, and a customer notices first. | |
| Incident Response & Resilience | The agent must have a defined fallback: a deterministic path, a manual process, or a documented acceptance that the process stops. | The work cannot be completed when the agent is unavailable or has been stopped. | |
| Incident Response & Resilience | Concentration of agents on a single model, provider or orchestration platform must be documented and formally accepted. | A single provider incident takes out an unknown share of business processes at once. | |
| Incident Response & Resilience | A stopped or quarantined agent must not return to service until it has been restored from a trusted baseline and approved by its owner, and this recovery procedure must be tested at a defined interval. | A compromised agent is restarted with its poisoned state, or recovery fails because it was never tested. | |
| Incident Response & Resilience | On loss of the agent, its model or its communications, controlled equipment must move to a defined safe state. | Equipment keeps running on the last command after the agent fails or is stopped. | |